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ABSTRACT
This thesis is intended for use by the Business Services
Division of the Massachusetts Industrial Services Program in
setting policy for the Economic Stabilization Trust. It looks at
the role of the Trust in the context of an imperfect capital
market, and discusses several issues of concern to proper
operation of the Trust. The major questions addressed are: how
should the Trust target its financing? how should the Trust
price its financing? how should the Trust incorporate non-
financial concerns into a financing decision? how can the Trust
obtain additional funding for investment and operating expenses?
Principle conclusions are as follows. First, before
agreeing to participate in a turnaround or buyout, the Trust must
ensure that a business is genuinely unable to obtain suitable
funding from other sources and that it is likely to be viable and
able to repay the Trust's investment over the long term. If the
Trust is too risk averse or, conversely, acts in a risk ignorant
fashion, it will be ineffective in its economic stabilization
purpose.
Second, the Trust should have a general policy of charging
firms for capital at rates commensurate with risk according to
the standards of the market. Capital subsidies are almost always
unnecessary and unwarranted for troubled mature firms. However,
considerations of financial return should not be allowed to
dominate the Trust's investment decisions.
Third, the Trust should develop a consistent policy for
evaluating the potential social benefits of investments so as to
maximize the overall public benefit of the Trust's capital. This
should be accomplished through prescreening, portfolio selection
with regard for non-financial considerations, and incorporating
social concerns in investment agreements to ensure
accountability.
Fourth, the Trust should seek to reduce its dependence on
legislative appropriations, and thereby avoid political
pressures. Program Related Investments of philanthropic
foundations are suggested as one possible source of additional
investment capital for the Trust. Charges to client firms for
business services are discussed as a likely source of operating
capital.
Thesis Supervisor: Belden Hull Daniels
Title: Lecturer, Department Urban Studies and Planning
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Preface
The creation of the Massachusetts Industrial Services
Program (ISP) provides a unique opportunity in the history of
state economic policy. For the first time, a state agency exists
with a mandate to specialize in the problems facing firms in
mature industries and the needs of their workers. Moreover, the
ISP, through its investment financing arm, the Economic
Stabilization Trust (EST, or the Trust) has the capability to
make direct investments of public capital in troubled firms to
effect turnarounds and save jobs.
The attached report is intended to assist the director and
staff of the ISP in their efforts to develop policy for proper
use of the EST. In particular, it looks at the Trust in the
context of an imperfect market and a political environment to
develop recommendations on four major issues:
-how can the EST's capital be targetted to firms in an
appropriate fashion?
-what should the EST charge firms for using its
capital?
-how can the beneficial social impacts of EST
investments be secured?
-what are some non-state sources of funding for the EST
that can help it to ovoid overreliance on legislative
appropriations?
While discussion of these issues is undertaken with the
needs of Massachusetts' ISP in mind, it is hoped that this report
may be of some general use to other public purpose financial
assistance programs.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1
Successful development and utilization of the Massachusetts
Economic Stabilization Trust is a difficult and ambitious
undertaking. The EST must link job retention with sound
investment strategy. It must build institutional credibility and
autonomy in order to interact successfully with the private
sector, yet deal in highly risky and emotion charged situations
within a political and public environment.
The aim of this report is to provide a basis for
understanding the major issues facing the EST and discussing
strategies for addressing them in accordance with the Trust's
enabling legislation, its need to bridge public and private
sectors, and the experience of other development finance
institutions. These issues are:
First, how can the Trust target its capital to firms with
an appropriate level of risk so as to ensure maximum beneficial
impact on Massachusetts' economy? To be of any legitimate benefit
to the state's economy, the EST must use its capital to finance
mature manufacturing firms that are considered inappropriate for
investment by private sector financiers. At the same time,
although the Trust. is not held to standard "prudence"
requirements, loans and investments must be made in a financially
responsible fashion in order to protect the public's funds and
ensure the credibility of the institution.
Second, how should the Trust price its capital? By statute,
the Trust is not to invest on the basis of direct financial
return on investment. However the proper pricing of capital is
5
an essential consideration for any investment institution, public
or private, and is a necessary topic of EST concern. Over or
underemphasis on financial return will weaken the performance of
the Trust.
Third, how can the Trust achieve its ultimate goal of
avoiding the social. costs to Massachusetts citizens and the
fiscal costs to state and local governments of plant closings and
layoffs? The Trust is charged with incorporating these non
financial benefits in its investment decisions. The Trust's
administrators need to develop a method for doing so in a sound
and consistent fashion.
Fourth, from where can the Trust obtain additional
investment and operating capital? The EST's effectiveness in the
long run depends on its viability as an institution. To grow and
thrive, the EST will have to go beyond its relatively small state
funding and seek out other sources of investment and operational
funds.
The following four chapters try to develop an understanding
of these questions in order to guide the Trust's operation in
appropriate directions. The analysis and recommendations are
based on a review of development finance literature, planning
studies and informational materials from development finance and
technical assistance programs, and personal interviews.
1.2
Chapter 2 brings out some of the issues that must be
understood before the EST can assume an appropriate level of risk
in its investment activities, and an appropriate role in
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Massachusetts' business and financial markets. It focuses on ways
in which the Trust can achieve the proper balance between risk
avoidance and risk ignorance in its investment activity.
A well operated EST is a market perfecting institution. Its
expertise in the needs and problems of mature firms will allow it
to overcome the inefficiencies in the Massachusetts capital.
markets. Biases against certain industries or ownership forms on
the part of many institutions, the high cost of information and
transactions, the general risk aversion of many private investors
and the exclusion of non-financial public benefits from private
sector investment calculuses can contribute to the unavailability
of "timely high risk capital for corporate restructuring" that
the EST is intended to address. In determining the suitability
of an applicant firm for EST assistance, the Trust must consider
whether the firm is a victim of flaws in the market for capital
which result in the label "too risky" being applied
inappropriately from the public standpoint. The requirement that
the Trust invest only in endeavors that can not find sufficient
financing elsewhere serves to enforce this "market-correcting"
role, and define the Trust's market niche. If a firm with other
access to capital receives EST financing, the agency has merely
substituted one source of capital for another with no impact on
the overall availability of funds for economic development.
nn the other hand, the EST is, for good reason, restricted
by statue to investing in "economically viable" firms that have a
"reasonble chance" (Of csurvival as Successful businesses. If
capital is provided to unsound firms, the loan or equity
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investment is lost as the firm quickly fails. And the EST can
help to reduce the risk of its portfolio even further by
developing and monitoring a restructuring plan for every
successful applicant, including covenants in financing
agreements, and emphasizing coventures to spread risk.
In sum, the proper role of the EST is to provide financing
that is too risky for other financial institutions but not such a
gamble that it is likely to be lost. Inability to achieve this
balance will render the Trust ineffective as an agency of
economic development in Massachusetts.
1.3
Chapter 3 addresses the very important question of the
proper pricing of EST capital. It recommends that the Trust
invest with the expectation of a market based return commensurate
with risk on its portfolio of projects. The need for
institutional credibility demands that the EST not be seen as
merely another government giveaway program.
Proper lending or investment strategy considers two
dimensions: risk and financial return. The primary goal of
achieving a non-financial return for the people of the
Commonwealth does not mean that financial return can be ignored.
There are a number of important reasons for the EST to charge its
applicants at standard market rates for their capital. Most
importantly, in most instances it is the availability of capital
that is at issue, not its cost. If the Trust is successful at
targetting its funds to those opportunities "missed" because of
the imperfections of the market, it should be able to price its
8
capital according to market standards. Subsidizing a troubled
firm's capital costs is tantamount to rewarding it for the
internal inefficiencies or inability to compete in the
marketplace that led to its plight.
However, the chapter also cautions against the use of
financial return as a sole or even principal motivation for an
investment decision. It suggests the use of creative financing
methods to avoid the imposition of high capital costs on a firm
during the difficult early years of a turnaround. It emphasizes
that even the best deals from a financial standpoint are not
necessarily the best deals for the EST to make, given its
economic stabilization mandate.
1.4
In contrast, Chapter 4 addresses the incorporation of non-
financial return in investment decisions. It includes some
discussion of what the relevant social benefits are, how these
can be included in investment decisions by prescreening and
during formal evaluation, and how they can be maintained over
time by incorporation into financing agreements. The chapter
also considers how the non-financial return from EST funds can be
maximized by a suitable portfolio selection process, including
the investment of funds that are "uncommitted" to specific
projects.
The EST is charged with reducing the social costs of a
layoff or plant closing and with obtaining the fiscal benefits to
the state and municipalities of maintaining the operations of
businesses in Massachusetts. Maximization of social and fiscal
9
return to the state is a proper objective of the Trust's
investment strategy. However, this maximization should not be
unconstrained. A firm's long run viability must always be
paramount in an investment decision. Moreover, in light of the
Trust's limited resources, and the arguments against subsidizing
capital, desired non-financial benefits and distributional
considerations can serve as a basis for rationing a limited pool
of capital, rather than as a basis for pricing that capital.
1.5
Chapter 5 discusses briefly two potential sources of funding
support for the EST. Program related investments are made by
many philanthropic organizations for reasons and in a manner
quite consistent with the operation of the EST. These might be
sought as a complement to the Trust's investment funds. In
addition, by charging firms a reasonable price for consulting
services, the EST/ISP can increase its operational budget. -
The EST's initial $2 million capitalization, combined with
the $4 million requested for fiscal 1986, is A relatively small
amount of capital for an institution that is likely to invest an
average of one-quarter to one-half million dollars per deal. In
addition, an operational budget of $340,000 for the first year
sets a limit on the work that can be done by the EST/ISP staff.
While annual appropriations from the Legislature can keep
the Trust from running out of available investment or operational
capital altogether, an overreliance on this political body is
inappropriate and disadvantageous for an institution like the EST
which must invest without regard to political pressures or
1 ()
implications. The Trust should not feel itself pressured into
making unsound deals or avoiding good ones out of a concern over
the next year's funding level. The EST is authorized to take
advantage of any additional funding sources that it can find, and
to do so is an important strategy for the fund's long term
survi val.
1.6
The Economic Stabilization Trust will be a stronger
organization if it operates with an understanding that it exists
to take advantage of the investment opportunities that are left
unfinanced because of imperfections in the capital markets. By
compensating for these imperfections, the Trust is able to make
investments that are overlooked by traditional investors. In
doing so, the Trust has the opportunity to earn a financial rate
of return equivalent to that which private investors would seek
in assuming investments with a similar amount of risk.- As a
public institution, the Trust also has a responsibility to
incorporate non-financial considerations in its investment
decisions and because it is a public entity, can incorporate the
social and fiscal impacts of saving a troubled plant-- factors
ignored by most traditional financiers-- within its investment
calculus. Moreover, it can make investment decisions so as to
address the capitalized inequities of society by distributing its
limited resources to favor firms that maintain "good jobs,"
worker-owned firms, and those located in depressed areas. In
addition, the directors of the Trust should, even in this early
stage, operate with the long term effectiveness of the Trust in
11
mind, and work to reduce its dependency on the state legislature
for operating and investment capital.
The remainder of this report provides the EST with
guidelines for success. It draws on supporting evidence from
theory and from the experiences of other development finance
institutions. It is hoped that these guidelines will help the
Trust's administrators to make the most of an agency with great
potential for stabilizing and strengthening the declining sectors
of the Massachusetts economy.
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Chapter 2 Targetting the Trust's Capital
2.1
Any effective development finance institution serves to
expand the availability of capital to businesses that are unable
to get it because of the way the market works rather than through
any inherent failings of their own. In order to be successful in
its mission of stabilizing employment in troubled manufacturing
firms, the EST must overcome the factors that make many
traditional private investors reluctant to finance such firms.
In this way, the Trust can take advantage of investment
opportunities that have been overlooked or avoided by the private
sector. In short, the Trust must fill a "gap," in the
availability of capital by compensating for imperfections in the
capital market.
Because the Trust has a preference for non-financial return
and a duty to make the "high risk" investments that troubled
firms need, it is authorized to have a higher loss rate on its
investment portfolio than conventional lenders and investors. In
addition, in order to ensure that the Trust stays within the
capital gap-filling market niche established for it and does not
duplicate the activity of private sector investors, applicants
for EST assistance are required to show "due diligence" in trying
to obtain financing from other sources. The Trust is in the
seemingly precarious position of being a risk assuming investor
of last resort.
However, the Trust must also exercise constraint in assuming
risk. The Trust is required to consider a firm's economic
viability before investing. Some firms should not receive
capital at all, because they are unable to provide an expected
return -- both financial and non-financial-- sufficient to
outweigh their likelihood of failure. Even those businesses that
merit an investment of Trust capital can be made less subject to
failure or low return through mechanisms such as business
planning, technical assistance and monitoring.
The EST's acceptance of risk should not be in the form of
risk ignorance. To the contrary, the primary task of the EST is
to target its scarce resources to those firms with high risk that
also promise a substantial chance of success and a consequential
financial and non-financial return on the Trust's investment.
This chapter attempts to help the Trust strike a proper balance
between those firms that should not receive EST capital because
they are too risky, and those that should not receive it because
they are not risky enough. In short, it helps the Trust to
identify-and fill its "capital gap."
2.2 Overcoming Market Imperfections
In order to fill a capital gap, the Trust must be able to
identify and compensate for the imperfections of the market.
Proper targetting of the EST's limited resources requires an
understanding of the imperfections in the capital market that
affect mature firms, and the ways in which the Trust can address
these imperfections. Four types of "imperfect" behavior are
particularly relevant to the EST's role.
First, a conventional financier, faced with a chance to
finance an endeavor such as the turnaround of a shaky but
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promising mature firm or the worker buyout of a major
corporation's branch plant, may automatically presume the
investment to be "too risky" to be worth the return. This
assumption may be based on a general perception that all such
efforts are unduly risky.
Second, the financier may lack the information to assess
properly the risk of the endeavor, and may consider it too costly
to obtain what he/she needs to know. It is easier, less
expensive, and involves less uncertainty to invest in more
conventional businesses about which a great deal more is known,
and so the unusual application is denied.
Third, the financier may know enough to consider the
buyout or turnaround an acceptable risk, but may not consider it
worth the cost or effort to perform the complicated financial
packaging necessary to complete the deal.
Fourth, the risk averse private lender or investor may
be unable or unwilling to bear- all the risk associated with a
given investment or may require an extremely high financial
return to compensate for the possibility of a failed investment.
These market imperfections -- prejudicial behavior on the
part of financial actors, excessive information costs, high
transactions costs, and extreme risk aversion among investors --
can all be addressed by the EST. The key to the Trust's success
in correcting for capital market imperfections will be its
ability to develop a specialized expertise in evaluating and
meeting the needs of its set of target firms.
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Avoiding Prejudice
Wintner notes that obtaining financing even for eventually
successful worker buyouts of mature firms is often a problem
because financing institutions are unfamiliar with or adverse to
the concept of worker ownership, and have a blanket assumption
that the previous owners "would not have planned a shutdown if
the business were potentially profitable." [1] Litvak and
Daniels point out that "political disTrust of the goals and
implications of new organizational forms," can cause an
investment institution to ignore an otherwise acceptable deal.E?
Both of these are examples of the prejudging of an investment.
Financial institutions might also discriminate against certain
businesses based on the kind of product they make or their
locations. The use of irrelevant characteristics to categorize
and dismiss a potential investment through "statistical
discrimination" precludes the gathering of sufficient knowledge
about its prospects.
The EST can address prejudice in the capital markets in two
ways. First, the Trust itself can consciously refuse to discount
an application based on the attributes of an industry, location,
or ownership form. In this way, the EST might even percieve as
"low risk," investments that conventional institutions assume to
be exceedingly risky. The Massachusetts legislature created the
Community Development Finance Corporation (CDFC) as an
institution that could overcome the tendencv of traditional
investors to discriminate against investments in depressed areas
of the state. Likewise, the EST can refuse to follow the general
16
tendency of investors to discriminate against worker owned firms,
or those in stagnant industries.
Second, by agreeing to participate in a venture, the EST can
alter prejudicial behavior on the part of other financing
institutions. This is important for helping the Trust to
leverage investment from more cautious institutions that may be
reluctant to be "first in" on a deal. The director of the New
England Trade Adjustment Assistance Corporation (NETAAC) has
found that evidence of "government support" can lend credibility
to a firm's fund raising efforts. [33
Overcominq High Information Costs
Small businesses, troubled businesses, businesses in
industries that are "out of vogue," privately held businesses,
and businesses that have been slated for a shutdown or are
undergoing a change of ownership are, as a rule, precisely those
businesses for which the investor wants the most information
before deciding to make an investment, and those for which this
information is most difficult and costly to obtain. As a result,
many potentially viable firms that have one or more of these
characteristics will be unable to obtain capital from private
institutions because of a reluctance or inability on the part of
lenders and investors to gather the information needed to assess
them. These financiers will, instead, concentrate on firms for
which less, more readily attained information is needed -- sound,
publiclv held, or well-known businesses in stable industries.
The EST can compensate for this lack of inexpensive; easily
obtained information in two main ways. First, through
17
specialization, the Trust can reduce its own cost of gaining
information about potential investments. The EST's access to in-
house and external expertise in the needs and problems of mature
firms and alternative ownership forms, its access to the state's
economic data base, and its capacity to obtain and analyze firm-
specific information, all serve to reduce the cost of gathering
information for use in evaluating an application for financial
assistance. As a result, it is quite possible that the Trust
will assess a firm more favorably than do risk averse investors
with less information. Over time, as the Trust gains experience
in analyzing particular types of firms and investments, economies
of scale may result, information costs decrease further, and the
Trust's comparative advantage in providing high risk capital
increase. This will allow the Trust to pursue investments that
are too costly for private investors to investigate fully. It may
also cause the Trust to price capital slightly lower than other
institutions that are less familiar with the relevant industries,
factor markets and actors and which therefore impute more risk to
the deal.
Second, the Trust can prompt the involvement of other
investors in its "high risk" ventures by serving as a source of
free information on the peculiarities of mature industries and
firms and alternative forms of ownership. Once such information
is obtained by the EST, it can be virtually costless to spread it
to other investors. A case study of the Bates' Fabrics ownership
transfer notes the reluctance of one bank to take on a "loan with
two unknowns -- the [Employee Stock Ownership Plan] and the FmHA
guarantee." [43 By actively familiarizing banks and other
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investors with such alternatives, the Trust may increase their
willingness to finance economic development. This could be
accomplished by sponsoring seminars, distributing published
material, or making personal contact with investment officers.
The Trust's easy access to relevant information can also
prove beneficial in cases where time is of the essence. A rapid
infusion of capital is often necessary to successfully implement
a turnaround plan while the business is still viable. Yet the
time frame for private investment decisions is usually quite
long, Several months or more may pass before the deal can be
closed. Long turnaround on financing decisions has been cited as
leading to the failure of many firms that could otherwise have
been helped by Federal Trade Adjustment ASsistance. [53 By
maintaining contact with and providing information to other
investors, both public and private, the EST may be able to
leverage money faster from these other sources.
Overcominq High Transactions Costs
The time and difficulty involved in completing transactions
involving several parties, non-traditional financing methods and
unusual ownership forms can lead to the unwillingness of the
private sector to take on deals of this nature. Given the high
costs of complicated transactions, many will not be completed,
even though from the standpoint of risk and return, they might
otherwise be considered suitable.
Through its specialization in complicated financings, the
EST can address this market imperfection. Specialization should
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allow the Trust to overcome some of the costs of drawing up
complicated business plans, monitoring investments, and arranging
intricate financial packages and investment agreements. This can
allow the Trust to make deals that the private sector would not
complete on its own and to price capital lower than institutions
that are less familiar with complicated transactions. By acting
as the "packager" of deals involving other public and private
investors, the EST can reduce the transactions costs as well as
the information costs of other institutions and may be able to
leverage more or lower priced capital from them. The Trust was
originally conceived as "the deal maker," and has an important
role to play in that regard. [6]
Overcoming Risk Aversion
The risk aversion of private sector investors also
prevents many worthy investments from being financed. High risk
deals will not be made if the risk of each individual investment
cannot be spread among a number of investors' portfolios, if each
investor can not "pool" his/her investments so as to reduce
overall portfolio risk, and if the return expected by an investor
does not compensate for the risk incurred in making the
investment..
By its willingness and ability to address the constraints
of risk aversion, the Trust can complete deals that would not be
made by private sector financiers. The EST automatically spreads
the risk of an investment by its status as a publicly funded
institution. It can also help other financiers to spread risk by
coventuring with them. Although the Trust is restricted in its
ability to pool risk through a diversified portfolio, there are
ways in which the effects of these restrictions can be reduced.
Finally, the Trust is able to consider the non-financial benefits
of avoiding a plant shutdown as additional compensation for
assuming risk -- something private sector investors are unwilling
to do.
Risk Spreadinq
Inherent in the Trust's status as a publicly funded
institution is a powerful risk spreading technique. The risk
assumed in an investment is effectively spread among the millions
of taxpayers who have contributed to the Trust's capitalization.
In this way, the EST is by nature more effective at taking on
risk than investment institutions backed by fewer individual
investors.
Moreover, the Trust can also reduce the perceived riskiness
of an investment by its emphasis on coventures and leveraging
financing from other sources. In this way, the EST's limited
amount of capital will be spread among a greater, more diverse
set of investments than if it acted as the sole supplier of
bigger individual investments to fewer firms. In this way, too,
the Trust can "share" the risk of a failed investment with other
institutions. A 1982 report criticizes CDFC for assuming
e.cessive risk by its inability to coventure with other
capitalists. This failing was attributed to the agency's low
profile and lack of credibility in the investment community. [73
Poolinq Risk Through Portfolio Diversification
The Trust can also limit the impact of high risk investments
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by concern for the makeup of its portfolio. The Trust's mandate
to invest in troubled mature manufacturing firms in
Massachusetts, hinders its ability to pool away risk through the
common strategies of diversification by industry sector and
geographic location. Still, the Trust can avoid an overemphasis
on any one type of firm, and might invest in businesses with
nationwide or international markets, as well as those that sell
primarily in New England or Massachusetts.[8] Kentucky
Highlands Investment Corporation (KHIC), an economic development-
motivated venture capitalist in Eastern Kentucky with an
admirable record for investment success and job creation has
reportedly developed "portfolio guidelines regarding mix of
industry types, labor-capital tradeoffs and technology level
geographic distribution, investment volume (by deal and dollar
amount) and debt : equity mix." This "ensures against a
reactively generated, unbalanced and therefore, additionally
risky portfolio."[9] It is suggested that the EST likewise reduce
portfolio risk through some efforts at diversification.
Considerinq Non-Financial Return
Another extremely important way that the EST compensates for
the imperfections of the market is by its consideration of non-
financial benefits when analyzing the tradeoff between risk and
return on investment. A private sector financier will concern
himself only with financial return and may not be willing to
complete a deal if there is too much uncertainty about the
expected return. The Trust can undertake investment with a wide
variance in expected financial return if it is able to ascertain
that non-financial return is likely to be high. Chapter 4 looks
in detail at the internalization of non-financial "externalities"
in the Trust's investment calculus.
2.3 Expanding Capital Availability
The EST's success at addressing market imperfections depends
on its ability to hold to the "fundamental economic development
principle" that public funds should not be used to displace
private investment.[10] It is in this light that the requirement
that an applicant for EST capital demonstrate "due diligence"
should be interpreted, and the concept of an EST "niche" in the
market for capital be understood.
Due Diligence
The best way to ensure that the EST is not displacing
capital from other sources is to interpret strictly the
requirement that an applicant have made a diligent attempt to
secure funding from other sources before receiving EST capital.
Various institutions and programs apply similar rules, and the
most common interpretation is a "three bank" requirement. Before
agreeing to a deal, Massachusetts Capital Resource Company
requires that an applicant have a BAA bond rating and certify
that it has been turned down by three other institutions.[11) The
Federal Office of Economic Opportunity's Community Economic
Development funds were available in the 1960's and 70's to
projects that had been denied financing by three banks.U123
Small Business Administration programs also nominally apply a
"three bank" requirement.
In applying this rule, the EST should make a practice of
helping applicants to contact all suitable quasi-public financing
sources as well as any private lenders or investors thought to be
particularly appropriate for participation in a specific deal.
Among the quasi-publics, MCRC has over half of its portfolio of
more than $125 million in mature industries and has experience in
turnaround and leveraged buyout situations.113] Massachusetts
Business Development Corporation (MBDC) makes about one-fourth of
its investments in the form of leveraged buyouts.[143 Community
Development Finance Corporation (CDFC) also has a considerable
degree of experience (both successful and unsuccessful) with
buyouts and turnarounds of mature firms. The Trust's role in
packaging capital from other sources is at least as important as
its direct financial participation in a deal.
Requiring a firm to make a concerted search for capital from
other sources before coming to the EST does not impose a hardship
on either the firm or the Trust. A guidebook for companies
looking for capital suggests that any firm should start its
search by making calls to a half-dozen financial
institutions.C1.5] The more institutions that have a familiarity
with the firm's needs, problems, and strong points, the easier it
should be for the EST to find partners if it decides to invest,
and the more sources of opinion and advice the EST staff can call
upon in the event of a questionable application. The Trust might
want to distribute its own manual to guide firms in their search
for capital.
Furthermore, applying due diligence ensures that the EST (or
any development finance institution) has a clearly defined role
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to play in the relevant capital market. This has the additional
effect of helping to legitimate the institution in the eyes of
other investment organizations. MCRC's rule is intended to
emphasize that the company is not taking business away from banks
and other investors on whom it relies for referrals.[163 Kentucky
Highlands Investment Corporation (KHIC) follows similar reasoning
in its policy of deferring to banks as primary lenders.[17]
Due diligence in a capital search should not be limited to
banks and other outside institutions. A firm's own resources
should be carefully examined. In his study of the Federal Trade
Adjustment Assistance program, Weiss highlights the "General
Bearing" case in which he concludes that a public investment was
unnecessary because the firm had disguised its access to internal
resources that were sufficient to effect reorganization. To
prevent such abuses, the Trust might require that the applicant
submit audited financial statements including full disclosure of
liabilities and assets, and that top management pledge personal
property as collateral.[18]
For a similar reason, one policy that the EST should
adopt is that of not making capital available to branches of
conglomerates or multi-state corporations. MCRC addresses this
issue by refusing to invest in a company that is more than 10
percent owned by a company with a higher bond rating.[191 The
EST should consider applying a similar requirement.
The literature on capital mobility as well as the experience
of many local branch plants show how easily capital can be
transferred from one branch to another based on the parent
company's convenience. The failure of a branch plant of a large
corporation is often a conscious decision by the parent company,
or else an inadvertant result of the parent's poor management.
Owners can remove capital from branches by redirecting
profits, allowing equipment to depreciate for tax purposes,
selling off or removing physical capital from less profitable
branch plants, and ultimately declaring a plant shutdown.[203
Absentee ownership may impose diseconomies due to improper
attribution of overhead, restrictive purchase and sales
requirements, and other practices.[213 These actions may be
wholly unrelated to the potential viability of the plant as a
unit, and even to the abilities of a plant's management in the
absence of external control.
control over or even knowledge
A relevant case example i
which in 1980 recieved public
million of interest-subsidized
for their Playskool subsidiary
approve the low interest bonds
expand production capacity and
did the size of the workforce
late 1984, the firm announced
operations out of state, belie
Local management may have little
of corporate decisions.[22][23]
s that of Hasbro-Bradley, Inc.,
assistance in the form of $1
IRB's from the state of Illinois
plant in Chicago. The decision to
was based on a company promise to
employment in Chicago. Not only
decline almost immediately, but in
its decision to move the plant's
ing the long term economic
development intent of the public financing.[24]
A similar story is that of Farberware Corporation which
employs 1700 in the South Bronx. In 1980, the city and state of
New York packaged $8 million to keep Farberware in the city. By
1984, the company president was once again threatening to leave
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unless the city and state provided another $3 million in aid.[253
Faced with a request for capital assistance from a failing
branch plant, the Trust should work only to arrange a buyout by
workers, management, or other non-conglomerate purchasers and
should not consider lending to or investing in the plant under
the same ownership. (This should not preclude an EST investment
when the firm that is selling its plant presents a source of
partial financing for the buyout effort in the form of preferred
stock or subordinated debt.)
The Implications of Failed Investments
By requiring through "due diligence" that an applicant for
capital be unable to meet the market's standards for obtaining
financing, the EST is able to ensure that its own efforts to
compensate for market imperfections are alleviating a genuine
capital gap. In large part, the Trust fills this capital gap by
accepting a greater degree of uncertainty about the return from
its investments than would be allowable to more risk averse
financial institutions. In accepting this risk, it is possible
that the Trust will encounter a higher investment loss rate than
traditional lenders and investors; indeed the enabling
legislation explicitly recognizes this fact.
The EST's director has expressed some concern over what
investment failure rate should be expected, given the Trust's
mandate to seek out "high risk" investments. There is no precise
standard for what an "acceptable" rate of failed investments or
defaulted loans is. However, a look at the investment failure
rates of some other institutional investors provides some
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guidance for determining appropriate boundaries.
Within the capital markets., there is a wide range of
experience with regard to write-off rates. At one extreme are
conventional thrift institutions, which are very risk averse,
and may make commercial loans with the expectation that only one-
tenth to one-fourth of one percent of the loans made will be
eventually written off.[26J At the other extreme, some well-
regarded start-up venture capitalists will accept a 60 percent
failure rate because their direct financial returns from equity
positions in successful investments are so high.
Within the public sector, the range is just as wide.
Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority (PIDA) between 1956
and 1980, wrote off less than one-fiftieth of one percent of its
loans.[27J CDFC, on the other hand, reports a failure rate of
about 50 percent on its venture capital program, with 16 of 34
equity and subordinated debt investments written off at a cost of
$3.6 million.[27] The Federal Trade Adjustment Assistance loan
program had a 65 percent default rate until organizational
changes were instituted in 1981.[29]
For different reasons, none of these publicly-capitalized
institutions is providing financing in a proper "gap-filling"
fashion. The PIDA figures suggest extreme caution on the part of
the lending institution -- too much caution for a risk-assuming
development finance institution. In this case, the extremely low
write-off rate suggests failure rather than success as a public
financing agerncy. "PIDA is not providing loans to firms which
are any riskier than those financed by the private sector."[30]
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On the other hand, the CDFC and TAA figures suggest that
those institutions went beyond correcting true market
imperfections to the point of rewarding inefficiency through risk
ignorance. Such a tendency carries with it the penalties to an
institution's credibility and stability associated with such high
failure rates. As a result of the federal administration's
disenchantment with this program, TAA has seen its funding
slashed.31] CDFC, originally designed to be self-sustaining, has
returned to the state legislature for more financing -- assuming
only a 20 percent failure rate in its recapitalization request's
financial projections. Presumably, this is based on a more
cautious process for assessing a firm's likelihood of
survival.[32] To contrast, Massachusetts Technology Development
Corporation, which has a loss rate of under 5 percent on its
start-up venture investments, has received annual appropriations
from the legislature to increase its investment base.[33)
The implications of a high failure rate are particularly
relevant to the EST. Since the Trust is a capitalist of last
resort, businesses seeking its capital will have already been
turned down by traditional lenders and investors. But as noted
earlier, successful coventuring is critical to the Trust's
ability to address market imperfections by spreading investment
risk, and also to its ability to make the most of its limited
resources. It therefore will fall upon the EST to engineer a
financing package involving other institutions. Some of the
EST's most likely coventurers will be institutions that had
initially refused the troubled firm but are newly persuaded by
the presence of state money and technical assistance which can
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absorb some of the risk and reduce transactions and information
costs. If the EST develops a reputation as a poor assessor of the
potential viability of a firm, or makes financially unadvisable
decisions based on social and political considerations, it will
be unable to persuade other institutions to enter into
partnerships.
Moreover, the ability of the ISP/EST to save jobs by
assisting troubled firms depends directly on the reputation it
has among its potential clientele. If a firm that is in trouble
and needs capital and consulting help perceives ISP/EST as a
poorly run organization, it will be unwilling to seek or accept
advice in the form of technical assistance or a restructuring
plan. An EST with a track record of bad investments is hardly a
credible source of management information for a troubled firm.
The next two sections discuss ways in which the Trust can avoid
unviable investment propositions, and how the Trust can reduce
the likelihood of failed investments.
2.4 Avoiding Unviable Firms
There is one very important way in which the EST can insure
that in assuming risk it does not incur loss rates as high as
those noted for CDFC and TAA and that it maintains its integrity
and credibility as a player in the capital market.. The Trust must
be certain to make a clear and comprehensive assessment of a
firm's viability before supplying it with capital. It is
essential to the Trust's success that it be able to do this well
before making a loan or investment.
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Assessing Firm Viability
Capital is a necessary but insufficient factor for firm
viability, and in fact cash flow difficulties are invariably a
result rather than a cause of less obvious problems. The
director of Ohio Technology Transfer Organization notes that many
firms will automatically assume that they can solve their
problems with a million dollars, when the root cause of their
million dollar shortfall remains and will continue to hinder the
firm's profitability.[34] The only way to find out whether an
applicant firm is inherently uncompetitive and inefficient or
suitable for a turnaround or buyout effort is to conduct a
thorough diagnostic examination of the firm. The diagnostic
should assess viability in terms of market demand for the firm's
output, and the availability of suitable factors of production --
in particular, skilled and enthusiastic management. The Trust
must be consistent in refusing to risk capital in firms with
apparently poor future viability. There is no contradiction in
being a "high risk" investor and expecting a priori that each
individual investment will be a success.C353
One of the prerequisites for a successful turnaround is
Sufficient market demand for the firm's product(s) and A
reasonable expectation that this demand will continue to exist.
Alternatively, there should be the potential for the firm to
alter its product line or marketing strategy to match shifts in
the market. As an example, the Cornish Wire company in
Williamstown, closed by its parent company because of a declining
market for rubber coated wire, was the subject of a successful,
job-retaining, state assisted buyout by a firm willing to convert
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to production of plastic coated wire, a modern product with a
sound market forecast. In contrast, Revere Sugar Corporation in
Boston shut down as a result of nationwide overcapacity in the
cane sugar industry. In the absence of sufficient markets for
the firm's products, an investment to "save" this firm would have
been foolhardy.C363
The firm must also have access to suitable factors of
production at a competitive cost. These factors include strong
management, as well as appropriately skilled labor, raw
materials, appropriate production technologies, energy, land and
facilities, and transportation.
Management's suitability to implement a turnaround plan is a
particularly important factor that is often underestimated. Poor
management, as in an inability or unwillingness to make the tough
decisions required to increase profits through "cutting fat," is
quite often the determining factor in the firm's existing
troubles. One of the reasons for CDFC's poor investment record
has been its historic failure to pay adequate attention to the
suitability of a venture's management team.[37] On the other
hand, the highly successful KHIC devotes a great deal of
attention to evaluating management quality in considering an
investment.[38] The EST board's evident understanding of the
crucial nature of strong management in a successful turnaround is
an encour'aging sign.
The inadequacy of other production factors also reduces the
likelihood of a Successful turnaround effort. Deerfield Specialty
Papers in Monroe is plagued by high energy costs, inadequate
facilities, and poor access to transportation. Financial
assistance to a firm like this is futile unless it can be used to
somehow resolve these problems. Foster Forbes in Milford is
experiencing high energy and transportation costs in comparison
to its competitors, and faces periodic shortages of raw material
for manufacturing glass. In addition, the market for the firm's
products is questionable. Unless it is possible to overcome
these obstacles to a successful turnaround, any investment of
capital in a buyout effort would be unwise.
The firm's existing financial situation also reflects on its
ability to survive a restructuring period. NETAAC requires a firm
to have sufficient cash flow to last 12 months in order to be
considered "viable."E39]
Information for assessing a firm's viability should be
gathered from the formal application for assistance, as well as
from site visits and additional research by the EST staff. In the
end, assessing a firm's viability is necessarily a judgement
call, but if done in a comprehensive fashion by skilled analysts,
the chance of a costly error is diminished.
The expectation that an applicant firm will be viable
throughout the term of an investment aareement must. be a non-
negotiable prerequisite to a favorable financing decision. This
is in spite of the fact that short run considerations of the
social impacts of a shutdown and ensuing political pressure may
suggest that the Trust make capital available to temporarily
prolong a firm's life. The Trust's capital should not be used as
a means of merely delaying an inevitable shutdown. This point can
not be overemphasized.
The Adams Printworks story is a local case study which
shows the futility of making ill-advised investments to prolong
employment under the pretense of saving a firm.[403 Despite
troubles with management, the physical plant, and questionable
market demand, public and private institutions provided over $3
million dollars in a last ditch attempt to save jobs in the
depressed Northern Berkshires. In just over a year after closing
the restructuring deal, the jobs initially "saved" were lost for
good, along with a hefty investment of state money that could
have been used more productively elsewhere. An MCRC staff member
admits that participation in that deal was purely a gesture to
political pressure. The company had no realistic expectation of
ever seeing a return on its $200,O)O investment.[413 CDFC
also fell prey to an emotional response to the high unemployment
of the Adams area and the hundreds of workers who would lose
their jobs if the plant shut down. It was clear to them and
others that the fiscal and social benefits of avoiding a shutdown
merited a public investment even if the financial return were
negligible. What in retrospect seems to have been discounted was
that the firm faced problems in its management and operations
that no amount of capital could possibly overcome. The shutdown
was not avoided but merely postponed. With hindsight, it is
evident that if the firm's viability had been properly assessed,
the futility of the proposed turnaround effort would have been
apparent.
In general, as in the APW case, direct assistance to
workers, (as through the ISP Reemployment Assistance Programs),
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is a far better long run strategy than helping to prolong
artificially the life of a dying business. Even to the employees
of a troubled firm, providing capital to defer a shutdown in the
guise of "saving" a plant should not make sense. Workers will
not look for new jobs if they feel that their old ones have been
preserved. If they do continue to look for new jobs, the slight
chance of restoring the firm to health diminishes as the
experienced labor force leaves.
From the standpoint of the state's long run economic health,
keeping open firms that are inherently or irreversibly
uncompetitive and inefficient "will only intensify and delay the
need for restructuring the economy."[42] Such firms' inability to
find financing in the marketplace is no evidence of market
failure, and therefore there is no role for the trust to play in
providing capital assistance.
2.5 Reducinq Risk
Once the Trust has determined that a firm is viable and has
made a decision to provide some of the financing needed, there
are a number of additional steps that it can take to limit risk
and increase the likelihood of obtaining a return on its
investment. The Trust can work with a firm to strengthen its
turnaround strategy and can incorporate key points of the plan
into covenants of the investment agreement. The staff of the EST
can monitor adherence to the business plan and covenants, and if
circumstances warrant, can recommend that the Trust modify the
terms of an agreement in order to secure greater long term
benefits.
Business Planning
As an arm of the ISP business services program, the EST has
the capacity to work closely with a firm to devise a sound
business revitalization plan, and can provide access to the
technical assistance and consulting advice needed to implement
the plan. Some of the most successful finance institutions
devote substantial resources to improving the chances for success
of their portfolio firms. KHIC, for example, spends "an
inordinate amount of time" on developing management expertise in
firms which they consider worth the investment risk.[43)
Investment Covenants
Even the best business turnaround plan is no assurance
against failure if it is not followed. The Trust's enabling
legislation allows operational requirements to be incorporated
into the Trust's financial agreements. If a business strategy
and a financial agreement are intertwined, there is an explicit
incentive for the management of a firm to try to stick closely to
an agreed upon plan of action. A financing agreement can
coordinate repayment schedules according to the needs of the
business plan, and can include terms that require management to
seek consulting assistance. (ICA requires this of businesses that
receive financing from its loan pool.[443) Although some managers
feel threatened by the imposition of covenants that might
constrain them, reasonable covenents "are nothing more than a
reflection of a good business plan." An agreement ought to give
the management sufficient flexibility to run the business, while
giving the investor "an opportunity to exert pressures in case
problems develop."E45]
Monitorinq
The ability to exert these pressures intelligently depends
on the extent to which the Trust maintains familiarity with a
company once a financing agreement has been completed. Regular
monitoring of all investments in the EST portfolio can serve to
flag problems in their early stages. A number of organizations
consider active monitoring of portfolio firms as essential to
reducing the likelihood of encountering defaults and failed
investments. The TAA program requires 8 hours of monitoring per
quarter to ensure that a loan recipient is meeting a timetable of
progress objectives.146] ICA's revolving loan fund for worker
cooperatives requires ongoing reporting and monitoring as a
condition of the loan.C47] The poor performance of CDFC's
portfolio has been attributed in part to the agency's lack of
good monitoring practices.481 On the other hand, MCRC plays an
"inactive investor" role, and limits monitoring to regular review
of covenants and financial statements.[49] It is likely that the
EST will significantly reduce its rate of investment loss by
continuing to monitor its portfolio firms frequently and
regularly until the investments are repaid.
If through monitoring, the Trust finds that a particular
firm is not adhering to its business plan as agreed upon in the
financial documents, there are two options. One is to modify the
agreement. The Trust is enabled to consent to modification of
any terms of a financing agreement. If a change in circumstances
external or internal to the firm makes the goals of a business
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plan seem unrealistic or a covenanted activity detrimental to the
health of the firm, then modification is the appropriate tactic.
Macroeconomic forces, changes in goods market conditions, an
unavoidable work stoppage, or a drastic change in management are
all examples of circumstances that could prompt contract
modification.
The other option is to foreclose on the loan or withdraw the
investment. If management is uncooperative, and the health of
the firm along with the safety of the public investment is at
stake, then foreclosure is an appropriate response. To do so
even once, would enhance the Trust's reputation for "meaning
business." It would, however, carry a political cost. How could
the EST, given its primary goal of employment stabilization,
justify penalizing a business for violating its agreement, if
that penalty meant that the firm would have to shut down or lay
off workers? This tactic seems appropriate only when there is
clear evidence that the firm is headed for a shutdown anyway. As
such, it is the ultimate "risk reduction" technique.
2.6 Summary
This chanter has discussed the role of the EST in
compensating for imperfections in the capital market in
Messachusetts, with the goal of indicating what type of
investments the Trust should select for its portfolio. On one
hand, to meet its responsibility to increase the availability of
capital to troubled mature firms, the Trust needs to assume a
portfolio of firms that private sector investors view as
unsuitably risky given the ex-pected financial return. It can
accomplish that strategy by developing an expertise in the needs
of mature industries to reduce transactions and information
costs, and by its willingness and ability to accept "high risk"
investments that have been overlooked by a risk-averse private
sector. The Trust ensures that it is actually filling a capital
"gap" by conscientiously applying the due diligence requirement.
On the other hand, the EST must invest its limited resources
in a sound manner if it is to meet its duties as an agent of long
run economic stabilization and adjustment. In this light, the
Trust should assess a business' viability in terms of access to
demand and factor markets before making a decision about
investina in that business. EST financial assistance must form
part of a legitimate solution to a firm's troubles, and can never
overcome the effects of inherent or irreversible inefficiencies
and uncompetitiveness.
Once deciding to undertake a risky investment, the Trust can
help itself to reduce the likelihood of poor portfolio
performance by creating and monitoring a sound business plan, and
tying financial asistance to the turnaround plan through
enforceable covenants. The fact that the Trust should make
investments that are somewhat riskier than private sector
prudency standards would warrant does not mean that it should act
in a "risk ignorant" fashion.
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Chapter 3 Pricing the Trust's Capital
3. 1
The previous chapter discussed the degree of risk which the
EST should assume in an investment, defining a range of activity
between "low risk" investments which can obtain capital from
other sources, and excessively uncertain investments that pose
such a likelihood of failure that the Trust's involvement would
be inconsistent with its purpose. But proper investment strategy
considers two dimensions: risk and return. To most investors,
seeking only to take advantage of the reward inherent in finding
an opportunity in the marketplace, the financial return on
investment is the relevant return consideration. The EST and
other publicly funded development finance institutions
consider both non-financial and financial returns in allocating
capital. This chapter will focus on the latter, while Chapter 4
will discuss issues relevant to obtaining non-financial return on
investment.
Although the Trust is "deemed to be investing not on the
basis of a direct financial return," it is also enabled to
"establish and collect such fees, charges and interest rates as
the Trust shall determine to be reasonable." A portfolio of
relatively high risk investments might still be carried without
forfeiture of institutional credibility or substantial loss of
rapital over the long run if the terms of the loans and
investments are such that the financial return obtained reflects
the degree of risk assumed.
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3.2 Why Charge for Capital at Market Based Rates?
It may be surprising that the EST, as a state capitalized
development fund, should seek a reasonable return to account for
risk rather than providing a substantial capital subsidy to needy
firms. Many public lending programs attempt to encourage private
investment by making capital available to firms that are unable
to obtain it from traditional sources, and then doing so at
substantially less than market prices.
But the purpose of a capital subsidy should be to
redistribute wealth and create new wealth in order to compensate
for some social inequity. The only inequity facing most firms
that the EST will be asked to assist is that they have been
unprofitable due to an inability to compete in relevant markets.
The result of a capital subsidy to such firms is, like the
provision of capital to firms that are not viable, to reward
inefficiency.
- Accordingly, the EST, like many very successful development
finance institutions, should make capital available at market
rates. Unless there is some extraordinary and compelling social
equity reason for providing a subsidy and the business can show
that a subsidy will make the difference between its success and
failure, there is no strong argument for the EST to subsidize its
capital. Certainly, the Trust should not make a general practice
of providing subsidized capital. There are a number of reasons
for this assertion.
First, in most cases, lowering the cost of capital will not
make the difference between a viable firm and a questionable one.
"If a business is basically sound, it can normally afford the
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cost of capital."[1] The cost of capital is far less important
than its availability.
Capital costs account for only about 14 percent of business
expenditures.[2] Therefore, making a portion of the needed
capital available at a marginally reduced rate will usually have
a comparatively small effect on a firm's costs. For example, a
10 year loan of $250,000 at 12 percent interest results in
monthly payments only about $550 higher than the same loan made
at an 8 percent rate. Given the likelihood that the Trust will
provide only a portion of the capital needed by the business, and
that the rest will be provided at market rates anyway, it would
take very large subsidies actually to affect most firms' viability.
Even then, the only firms for which it would make a real
difference would be those that even after a subsidy would be only
marginally successful.
Second, even if a subsidy is not necessary to effect a
successful turnaround, few firms would refuse to take the Trust
up on such an offer. An analogy is drawn to the survey performed
for the Massachusetts Industrial Finance Authority (MIFA) which
showed that 35 percent of repeat Industrial Revenue Bond users
were willing to admit that they would have expanded just as much
and just as rapidly even if subsidized capital were unavailable.
[3] Since the EST is not dealing with firms trying to decide
whether expansion is financially appropriate but with bailouts
and turnarounds of firms in dire need of capital, it can be
assumed that close to one hundred percent of firms offered
capital will accept it, no matter what the rate. There is no need
to shy from charging a price commensurate with the risk of this
financing.
Third, the presence of a significant capital subsidy might
attract nuisance applications by firms that are clearly unviable,
or by those that have ample access to private capital. If it is
made clear that the EST is not a mechanism for reducing capital
costs, many such applications, and the use of time needed to
process them, will be avoided.
Fourth, capital subsidies to firms based merely on their
inability to pay back the investment on more stringent terms can
promote the unattractive situation where the state government is
subsidizing a firm against its in-state competition. Why, for
example, should a healthy plastics company in Leominster have
higher debt service than its otherwise less healthy competitor in
Fitchburg merely because the former is able to obtain private
financing and is therefore ineligible for EST dollars? The EDA
loan program "solved" this problem by restricting eligibility to
those firms that were not in direct competition with other firms.
Of course, this critereon was unenforcable.E43 A better solution
would be to have a general policy of making all investments with
the expectation of a financial rate of return appropriate to
risk, no that a healthy firm is not placed at a disadvantage
because of its ability to obtain capital more easily.
Fifth, making the cost of capital reflect the risk
contributes to effecting successful turnaround plans. Stringent
terms can serve to impress upon management and owners of troubled
firms the severity of the joint effort required to forge a viable
business out of a troubled one. It is likely that sacrifices
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will be required: management changes may be made, product lines
and marketing plans altered, and the firm subject to austerity
measures. If the owners or managers balk at "paying for" the
risk incurred by lending institutions that fund their firms'
restructuring, their integrity in following the terms of that
restructuring are also called into question.
Fina.lly, but not to be overlooked, the higher the financial
return on the EST's portfolio, the greater the amount of capital
available for reinvestment in the years ahead. A return that
does not cover portfolio loss will result in a continual
reduction in the size of the Trust. Ideally, the Trust should be
thought of as self-sustaining.
The pricing policies of two financial institutions are
particularly instructional. Massachusetts Capital Resource
Company bases its charge for subordinated loans at about one
point (depending on the internally assessed quality of the
investment) above Moody's BAA rate for investments of the same
term and maturity. MCRC will very occasionally, and only when
warranted from the standpoint of a firm's survival needs, reduce
the cost of a loan they consider to provide exceptional public
benefit, particularly in the case of a minority owned firm. Even
so, the capital is still priced at a rate equal to that charged
the least risky of the other firms in its portfolio.[5] A
significant portion of MCRC's investments are in mature
industries and the company has participated in turnarounds and
buyouts.
Kentucky Highlands has "no specific desired return on
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investment," but holds fast to a policy of not. subsidizing
capital. Financial return on individual investments range as
high as 200 percent for successful equity deals, while loans are
made at typical market rates based on assessed risk. Since 1980,
when its federal funding was cut off, KHIC has increased its
capital base available for investments by over $4 million.[6]
The fact is that there are a number of advantages to
requiring that firms repay loans to the Trust at a rate
commensurate from the market's standpoint with risk incurred, and
that equity investment provide the opportunity for the EST to be
reimbursed with a competitive financial return. The
administrators of the Trust should avoid the temptation to
subsidize the price charged for loan or equity investments.
3.3 Helping Firms to Overcome High Capital Costs
It might be argued that the imposition of stringent interest
or dividend payments on a troubled firm is actually no help at
all. While the overarching issue is the availability rather than
the cost of capital, many businesses will not be able to achieve
the cash flow needed to service a traditional debt at mArket
rates during the early stage of a turnaround. If a firm is in
danger of failing financially, how can it be expected to survive
stringent payment schedules and high interest rates?
Some policy makers would respond to this query by noting
that in the rare case where reduced capital costs can make a
genuine difference between saving a firm and having it fail, the
Trust need not be dogmatic in its financial return requirements.
As long as the investment is extraordinarily compelling in its
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ability to provide non-financial benefit to the Commonwealth, a
case might be made for reducing the price of capital somewhat
below that warranted by risk.[7] As noted above, MCRC has taken
this position when faced with a minority-owned enterprise of
comparatively low expected profitability.
The EST need not forego financial return over the life of an
investment, however, in order to allow for the troubled
business' immediate cash flow requirements. The Trust has the
ability to alleviate pressure on a firm when times are difficult,
without needlessly subsidizing the cost of capital when the firm
is able to repay at market rates.
First, the EST should not expect to recoup much or even any
of its capital investment in the early stages of a turnaround.
The EST's portion of a financing package is likely to consist
solely or primarily of "patient" money: long term debt (much of
it unsecured and subordinated) and equity.
Second, payback and dividend schedules can be configured to
match the firm's business plan. The Trust can make regular use
of such "creative" financing methods as the issuing of royalties,
convertible debentures and warrants, deferred amortization,
balloon repayment plans, and other innovations to alleviate some
pressure on the firm during the first years of recovery.[8] Both
MCRC and KHIC will defer principal payments on an investment,
with the former making a practice of deferral for at least two
years on most loans. MCRC also takes warrants and convertibles
as "kickers" to increase its return on successful
investments.E93 Such mechanism-- allow the investor to reduce the
interest rate on a debt because of the expectation of greater
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returns in the future.
In addition, modification of stringent investment terms can
be made in response to unforseen setbacks in a firm's recovery
plan. For example, a general downswing in the business cycle
could very well delay the growth of a business, and might prompt
a temporary relaxation in the schedule for repaying loan
principal. If the Trust decides that a business is viable and
worthy of state effort to save, it should not insist on
inappropriate financing methods that hinder or halt a turnaround.
In ensuring itself of a financial return the Trust should be
certain not to contribute further to a firm's financial troubles.
3.5 Keepino Financial Return in Perspective
This chapter's emphasis on achieving a reasonable financial
return on investment does not, however, mean that the Trust
should try to maximize its financial return without regard for
its public purpose. The EST should be prepared to say "no" even
to the best deal from the standpoint of financial return, if the
economic development benefits to the state are not sufficient.[10]
Ray Moncrief of KHIC notes that an organization like the EST will
fail in its economic development purpose if it takes the attitude
that it must make only the best business deals.C11] A case in
point is CDFC which, in its earlier years, reportedly
underemphasized its community development goals in working to
meet a 21 to 24 percent target range for financial return.[12]
The next chapter discusses the Use of non-financial
considerations as a means of allocating the Trust's capital given
excess demand.
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3.5 Summary
As a rule, the best policy is that investments using state
provided capital be made at a price commensurate with risk.
Given the expectation of an occasional failure or poor
performance among portfolio investments, the Trust should attempt
over the long run to meet some minimum level of financial return.
Under no circumstances, however, should financial return become
the dominant goal of the Trust with regard to selecting firms for
its portfolio. Once a firm's initial viability has been
determined, the possibility of financial return should be
considered alona with the non-financial benefits of an investment
in distributing EST capital.
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Chapter 4 Considering Non-Financial Returns in Investment
Decisions
4.1
The ability of the Trust to attain a reasonable rate of
financial return through taking advantage of market opportunities
to fill a capital gap does not imply that the Trust seek blindly
to maximize its financial gain. The best investment from a
financial standpoint may have comparatively little social value
to the Commonwealth. Not only must the EST target its financing
to compensate for inefficiencies in the capital market, it must
also address the inequities whereby some socially valuable
businesses are excluded from receiving capital because they are
not judged by the private sector to be profitable enough.
"Narrowly defined private profitability is an insufficient
critereon for [public] investment decision making."[1] The basic
purpose of the EST is to reduce the social and fiscal impacts of
plant shutdowns on the Commonwealth, and the Trust should
distribute its capital with that goal in mind.
This chapter looks at the ways in which considerations of
social and fiscal benefit can be incorporated into the Trust's
portfolio investments. It discusses prescreening for minimum
social benefit; the weighing of non-financial benefit during the
decision whether to invest, including the concept of fiscal
return and the opportunity cost of capital; and incorporation of
these benefits into a financing agreement through covenants. As
a related point, although something of an aside, a suggestion is
made that the Trust consider investing funds that are uncommitted
to specific projects with a similar attitude of social concern.
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4.2 Prescreening
The EST should develop certain cut-off standards for one or
two key factors that will serve to cull quickly, projects that
are inappropriate for EST assistance.[23 These standards should
be in addition to the statutory requirement that an applicant for
assistance represent a "mature" firm looking to avoid laying off
workers, or a potential purchaser of such a business. Jobs
retained and wage rates are two indicators that could be used to
weed out applications not worth EST persual. These factors are
good proxies for a number of others, including state and local
taxes retained, and social welfare costs avoided. This
prescreening would take place immediately upon receiving an
inquiry about EST assistance, and would precede any formal or
informal assessment of a firm's viability.
It is reasonable to require that firms employ a minimal
number of people in order to merit EST attention. It takes just
as long to evaluate an application from a firm employing 25 as it
does to look at the application of a 250 person shop. However,
the social benefits of saving the latter are apt to be far
greater. And limited staff time is likely to be as much of a
constraint on the EST/ISP's effectiveness as limited financial
resources. A reasonable solution might be to impose a cutoff
somewhere between 1D) and 50 employees based on the total
employment of the firm's area.
For comparison, of the 181 troubled mature firms provided
technical assistance or loans through New England Trade
Adjustment Assistance Center during 1984, 44 percent had greater
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than 200 employees, while 41 percent had fewer than 50.[3] In
setting this cutoff, then, it is important to realize that some
viable and worthy firms may be excluded. The Ohio Technology
Transfer Organization (OTTO), faced with similar social goals and
staffina constraints employs a flexible cutoff depending on the
current demands on staff time.[4]
It also makes sense to require that firms receiving EST
assistance be those providing "good jobs." David Gordon defines
a "good job" as one which provides "adequate wages and fringe
benefits, job security, and stable employment, decent working
conditions, and opportunities for both advancement and
control."[53 EST should not invest its limited resources in firms
which do not pay a living wage and provide at least some measure
of job security. If such "poor employment" firms do shut down,
their employees might be better off in the long run after
retraining and placement or even relocation to a better paying
job. CDFC requires that all of its loans and equity investments
benefit firms that provide full time year round jobs paying at
least 150 percent of minimum wage with adequate fringes.[6] The
Trust should be particularly wary about investing to save
companies that hope to base their future competitiveness on low
labor costs. Sound economic development promotes good jobs, not
just jobs.
Prescreening for a minimum level of social benefit before
performing financial analysis seems to be a common technique of
socially conscious investment institutions. A report to the Ford
Foundation on Program Related Investments notes that social
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criterea are used to "open the door," initially, while "financial
criterea will make or break the case."E73
4.3 Maximizinq Portfolio Social Benefit
After a firm's application has passed "prescreening" and has
satisfied a stringent analysis of long term viability, it should
then be judged according to its potential for providing benefit
to the Commonwealth. There are several ways in which this
evaluation might be accomplished.
For one, the Trust might approve any investment that
satisfies the criteria for a level of financial return
appropriate to risk, and meets the needs of sound portfolio
management. The assumption underlying this method is that social
benefits are a "natural" side effect of sound economic
investment. This presupposes that the Trust invest only to
overcome inefficiencies in the capital markets without explicitly
addressing the inequities that exist in the distribution of
capital or looking for other desireable charasteristics in its
investments.
However, as discussed above, given excess demand for the
Trust's investment capital, the mere fact that an investment can
repay the Trust with a high financial return does not mean that
it is the best choice from an economic development standpoint.
There may be distributional considerations that cause an
investment with a somewhat lower expected financial return to be
a more compelling choice for the Trust's economic development
purpose. As a public institution, the EST has the ability to
favor those businesses that provide a chance to address
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inequities in the way capital has traditionally been allocated
and to account for those factors that are external to most
private institutions' investment decisions.
In light of this, a second and more preferable method of
assessing proposed investments would cause only projects that
exceed a certain expected level of non-financial return to be
forwarded to the Trust board for a final decision. Whether a
deal passes this second stage "cutoff" could be determined by
attempting to quantify the benefits through some type of point
system. Alternatively, it could be based on the process of
concensus among a number of staff members. The former has the
advantage of ensuring that evaluations will be made consistently
over time, however the difficulties of implementing a meaningful
system of quantification will likely result in ad hoc evaluation
as the preferred alternative.E8]
Given a constraint on the amount of capital available to the
Trust, the theoretical goal. of evaluating a project for non-
financial return should be to maximize the total beneficial
effect of the portfolio by comparing the benefits created with
the amount of capital required from EST. A non-exhaustive list
of factors to be considered formally or informally at this stage
would include:
1) the amount of taxes a firm and its employees pay in
Massachusetts;
2) the absolute number of jobs retained by the firm;
3)I)employment retention as a proportion of the relevant
area's labor force;
58
4)the demographics of the firm's workforce (eg. the
predominance of older, low skilled, foreign speaking workers);
5)the availability of alternate jobs in the same industry in
the area;
6)the extent of worker control or ownership of the
revitalized firm.
7)the amount of capital to be leveraged by a deal.
8)an estimate of any indirect and induced effects of a
successful turnaround.
Once an evaluation has been made, a satisfactory project should
be forwarded, with analysis and recommendations, for final
determination of its overall suitability for the Trust's
portfolio. E9]
Bell provides a model for making portfolio decisions
regarding investment in firms for economic development purposes.
He suggests that development finance institutions consider
financial return separately from non-financial ret-urn and address
each as a separate objective of a well-configured portfolio. In
this way, the tradeoffs in selecting a given project for
financing are made explicit. While on rare occasions reducing
the cost of capital for a particular project may be justifiable,
given great enough non-financial returns and a clear need for a
subsidy, income foregone by subsidizing one project can not be
invested in another. Therefore, the greater the number of
projects that need a financial subsidy, the fewer projects in
which the institution can invest. On the other hand, by
requiring a minimum level of financial return on a portfolio, the
financier imposes upon itself an additional constraint. A
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possible forfeiture of non-financial return is the cost of this
constraint, while the benefit is the generation of income, plus
whatever direct or indirect benefits the agency expects to
achieve by requiring the minimum level.E103
Another concept underlying the tradeoff between financial
and non-financial return is that of the opportunity cost of the
Trust's capital. Although direct repayment of the Trust's
capitalization is not required (for sound financial reasons -- a
debt financed institution would be unable to make equity
investments) the underlying rationale of the Trust's creation is
that a return to the Commonwealth is expected. This return is
the fiscal return to the treasury achieved through the avoidance
of social welfare expenditures and the retention of tax payments
on payroll and property achieved by a successful buyout or
turnaround. Fiscal return should, over time, exceed the
compounded cost to the state of borrowing the Trust's capital
appropriation for the EST to be a success in these terms. It is
important for the Trust to account for the fiscal return that it
creates, However, if the Trust gives proper emphasis to non-
financial considerations in deciding whether to complete a deal,
it should have no problem in attaining this minimum level of
fiscal return.
4,4 Incorporatin2 Social Concerns in a Restructuring Aareement
There are certain social concerns that the EST might want to
promote but that it would be difficult to impose as a general
requirement for receiving financing. It might, however, be
possible to bargain for these concerns while negotiating an
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investment agreement and to covenant them into a restructuring
plan.
One term that should be incorporated into any investment
agreement is the requirement that all funds supplied by the Trust
be used solely within Massachusetts. MCRC imposes a like
requirement, and in light of the earlier discussion about capital
mobility, it is only common sense to do so.E113 Only in this way
can the Commonwealth be assured of reaping any social and fiscal
benefits that occur as a result of its investment. (This
requirement is not a part of the "voluntary social compact.")
Concern for the needs of the workers to be employed at the
revitalized firm should be emphasized in a restructuring
agreement. Proper working conditions, some degree of worker
control or equity position in the restructured firm, compliance
with the "riQht to know" law, day care provision and similar
considerations would fall into this category. The EST should try
to avoid, to the extent possible given questions of firm
viability and competitiveness, the criticism of Britain's
National Enterprise Board which is said to overemphasize the
funding of productivity improvements at the expense of employment
concerns, or the TAA program, which has received similar
criticism.[123C13]
Without this awareness, there is no insurance that aid given
to a company will be felt by its workers. The Chrysler bailout, a
model (although on a much larger scale) for the type of work that
the Trust will be doing, included a drastic workforce reduction
that was centered on the minority labor force of Detroit, the
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location of 12 of the 15 plants shut down for good as a result of
the restructuring agreement.[143
The needs of the surrounding community should also be
emphasized. Affirmative action goals, social responsibility in
terms of the environment, and other community issues might be
considered in developing investment agreements. For example, the
Federal EDA requires that funded ventures be in compliance with
Federal environmental regulations.[153 By incorporating such
desirable traits in a written contract, the Trust can hold the
firm accountable over the long term to maintaining an agreed upon
level of benefit to the public.
At least one agency, the Greater London Council, even trades
off reductions in the cost of capital for the incorporation of
certain socially desirable outcomes in the restructuring
agreement.[163 While this idea may be worth considering from a
distributional standpoint, it does run contrary to our earlier
observations regarding the needless subsidization of capital.
Social benefit considerations should serve as a means of
allocating a limited supply of capital.
4.5 Investing Uncommitted Funds for Social Gain
EST can and should carry its mandate to consider social
factors in its investment beyond its economic development
portfolio. Funds uncommitted to specific projects need to be
invested, and this should be done in a socially conscionable way.
There are a number of investment plans that achieve market rate
returns while avoiding investment instruments that support anti-
labor activity, apartheid, and other questionable practices. The
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pension trusts of the Massachusetts state employees are one
example of a public fund that is required by statute to be
invested with a concern for such issues.
4.6 Summary
The consideration of benefits to workers, communities, and
the state treasury in the process for selecting firms to be
financed by the EST is clearly required by law and from the
standpoint of sound economic development. It is most essential
that an explicit and consistent policy be developed for
evaluating this form of non-financial. return. The objective of
the evaluation process should be to maximize the benefit created
by the Trust's portfolio, subject to reasonable constraints on
the portfolio's achieving an overall financial return. As a
public institution, the Trust has the capacity to internalize the
social benefits that the private sector sees as externalities,
and has the ability to consider distributional issues in
allocating its limited supply of capital.
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Chapter 5 Other Sources of Funds for the EST
5.1
The EST is constrained in its ability to assist firms which
fall victim to market imperfections by the limited investment and
operational funding that it has received from the Legislature.
The agency can overcome these constraints if it is able to obtain
funding from other sources. This chapter will look briefly at
possible sources of funds to supplement the legislative
appropriations on which the agency will survive during its first
year.
In addition to expanding the Trust's impact on economic
stabilization by allowing it to look for more "market
opportunities," the ability to obtain funds from non-state
sources is important for purposes of insulating the Trust from
political pressures to make unwise deals. As noted earlier,
pressure to mistarget capital to unviable firms can be a
significant factor in contributing to failed loans and
investments. By the ability to tap other investment funds, the
EST avoids a need to return to the Leoislature as funds are
committed; consequently, objective decision-making is easier.
Efforts in this direction are already under way with the
ongoing attempts to secure a portion of the Thrift Institutions'
Fund for Economic Development for use by the EST. An additional
potential sources of investment capital is the Program Related
Investment funds of philanthropic institutions, which can be used
to nupplement the Trust's. In addition, fees and charges for
EST/ISP business assistance services can be used to offset some
of the agency's operational expenses.
5.2 Program Related Investments
Many philanthropic foundations use a portion of their
endowments to pursue Program Related Investments (PRI's). These
investments are made "to support projects that have both social
and commercial components, where financial return is plausible
and where some amount of risk -- often moderate to high -- is
present.[1] As described in a 1984 report to the Ford
Foundation, the goals of foundations persuing PRI's are quite
similar to those of the EST. Other findings in this report
provide further evidence that cooperation between the EST and
foundations that make PRI's could be mutually beneficial.
The criteria required by most organizations making PRI's are
compatible with those of the EST. More than half of those
surveyed in the Ford report require a sound management team, a
worthy project unable to obtain commercial financing, and the
likelihood of repayment within an acceptable level of risk.
Another important consideration is the "likelihood that [the] PRI
would leverage other money."
What is more, there appears to be a clear opportunity for an
institution like the EST to address the needs of PRI-making
foundations. Most foundations report that they actively seek ut
projects for PRI's, but that demand is low. On the other hand,
although economic development is a goal of many foundations, case
studies and descriptions of 29 PRI investments included only one
that could be loosely interpreted as being a job-saving
investment in a "mature industry."[2] Moreover, few foundations
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provide any kind of business or technical assistance to the
recipients of investments. By its ability to identify deserving
businesses and to provide skilled assistance, the EST could be an
ideal venture partner for these foundations.
Seeking investments from PRI's could be a legitimate way for
the Trust to reduce the capital costs of those firms that
actually need and deserve a subsidy. More than half the PRI's
made are in the form of loans, and more than half of these are
made at more than three points below prime.
It appears that PRI's are a potential source of additional
financing for use in revitalizing mature industries in
Massachusetts. Most individual PRI investments are between
$100,O00 and $1 million, although some are larger. This suggests
two possible ways in which the EST could attempt to use PRI
capital to augment the Trust.
For one, foundations could be included along with private
and quasi-public investors in a financial package on an
individual investment basis. In this way, they are simply an
additional source from which the Trust can attempt to leverage
risk financing.
Another possibility, in line with the Trust's desire to
increase its own capital base, is for the Trust to attempt to
secure financing directly from one or more foundations to be used
as a part of the Trust's corpus. Ideally, this would take the
form of an equity investment in the Trust from which the Trust
could pay dividends out of its return from investments.
Alternatively, the Trust could access a revolving loan or
similar debt arrangement from a foundation. This latter
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arrangement is less preferred, because it restricts the Trust to
debt rather than equity financing where these funds are used. It
is unsound to make equity investments from a debt financed
capital source, since equity provides no guaranteed return to
repay the debt. It is suggested that some effort be made to
contact foundations with an interest in economic development in
Massachusetts to explain the purpose of the EST and to solicit
interest and involvement.
5.3 Charginq Fees For Business Services
The ISP/EST business services division can maintain an
independent source of operational funding by charging firms for
its services. This strategy has both advantages and
disadvantages, and there are examples of successful public sector
technical assistance programs in both the "fee-for-service" and
the "free help" camps. It is likely that the business services
staff of the ISP/EST will want to provide a combination of free
and for-charge assistance, depending on the extent and type of
services supplied, and the circumstances of the firm receiving
help.
The argument in favor of charging for ISP services is akin
to that in favor of charging firms for EST capital. It is a
waste of the ISP's limited resources to provide services free-of-
charge to firms which can afford to pay for them and which, in
the absence of the ISP, would seek such services within the
private sector. On the other hand; there will be instances in
which the ISP will not want to charge for business assistance, or
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may wish to subsidize its fees. This section makes
recommendations on this issue.
In general, the ISP should charge for services rendered to
any firm that is not in severe financial difficulty. The
enabling legislation specifically mandates that the ISP not
subcontract services to private consultants unless "the business
is unable to pay for these services." "Ability to pay" should
determine whether a fee is charged for services provided in-house
by the ISP as well. The interpretation of "ability to pay" should
be very narrowly defined, lest the ISP be used as a convenience
by firms wishing to avoid paying for services that they would
otherwise have to purchase.
By making a policy of charging for its business services,
the ISP contributes to its credibility as well as its financial
health. The agency will pose less of a threat to private
providers if it competes on the same terms, and does not
drastically undercut the prices charged by the private sector.
The ISP's charges are likely to compare favorably to charges by
private consultants, because the ISP can draw more easily on the
vast information resources of government, because salaries And
overhead costs are likely to be lower for the ISP, and
eventually, because the agency will develop a specific expertise
in the problems faced by mature manufacturing firms and the cost
of gathering information will decrease commensurately. NETAAC
bills clients at *60 per hour because of these factors, while
many private consultants charge in excess of $100 per hour.[3]
The bottom line is that by charging for its business
services, the ISP will be able to increase its resources for use
7(:)
in expanding its capabilities, and will avoid a total reliance on
legislative appropriations for its continued existence. The
ISP's stability over time will enhance its effectiveness at
strengthening the state's industrial base. On the other hand,
providing services for free requires that the business services
program "prove itself" each year in the minds of the Legislature
in order to receive funding to continue operations.[43 This can
make the program overly subject. to political whim. It is much
harder to argue against a state-sponsored service that pays all
or much of its own way through user fees and provides a
significant public benefit besides.
An example of a successful program run along the guidelines
suggested above is the Quebec Industrial Research Center (QUIRC),
a government sponsored business assistance program that offers
technology-related advice (as opposed to the ISP's likely focus
on management, resource, and financial problem-solving). QUIRC
receives some 3) to 40 percent of its annual budget from fees;
the remainder comes from the provincial government and is used
mostv forr marketing, and to disseminate information and hire out
for research with a general benefit to the province's industries.
QUIRC consciously avoids competing directly with private
consultants in its specializations, and makes frequent use of
outside firms in its assistance efforts. 1 5)
OUIRC, however, seems excessive in its policy of charging
all firms at cost for the assistance received, regardless of
their ability to pay. If a firm has difficulty paying for
services, QUIRC helps it to obtain aid for that purpose from the
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Canadian federal government or from outside sources. Were the
ISP to charge firms indiscriminantly for its business services,
it would be forced to concentrate only on clients that are still
financially healthy, and would be unable (in the absence of U.S.
federal assistance for needy firms) to help those businesses that
also need such services but are experiencing concurrent and
related financial distress, There are certain circumstances in
which the ISP will not want to charge firms for business
assistance on a fee-for-service basis.
The ISP will not want to charge for services which are based
on the program's ability to mobilize government resources and
access information and assistance from state and quasi-public
sources. In this role, the ISP merely acts as a clearinghouse
and facilitator for other government agencies that would provide
these services for free. Nor should the cost of monitoring
investments, an internal expense of a financing institution, be
charged directly to the firm being monitored.
The ISP may also want to set a cut-off level up to which all
services provided are free of charge. An initial period of
helping a firm without charge would serve to attract business,
while allowing the ISP to determine what more detailed assistance
was needed and available. The director of The Pennsylvania
Technical Assistance Program (PennTAP) notes that it is very
often not worth the cost of billing and accounting to charge a
firm for very short jobs, and further observes that a charge-free
period can serve to attract firms which may initially be
reluctant to hire out for advice.[6] The Federal Trade Adjustment
Assistance Program (TAA) provides up to three person-days of help
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free-of-charge. E7] The TAA program, however, also provides a
subsidy to firms of 75 percent of costs incurred (up to $75,000;
beyond this amount, the firm's share of expenses increases on a
sliding scale). The federal share of this arrangement has
averaged between $30,000 and $45,000 per firm over the life of
the program.[SJ It is likely that this figure includes
not only the cost of a diagnostic and a business plan, but also
some "hands on" work by TAA staff and subcontractors] A subsidy
of this magnitude negates most of the advantages of charging fees
for services, as discussed above. In addition, if costs were of
the order experienced by TAA, this would severely limit the
number of firms that could be assisted, given the constraint of
annual state appropriations. On the other hand, in the short
run, some amount of subsidy might be appropriate since state
funding is currently available, the ISP has no proven "track
record" and it will take some time until services can be provided
in a cost effective manner.
One situation in which directly billing firms for services
rendered is surely inappropriate is in the instances where firms
requesting assistance are in desparate financial situations, and
need an influx of capital from the EST as well as business
advice in order to ward off further difficulties. There are two
steps to analyzing this issue.
On the one hand, charging a financially troubled firm for
technical assistance merely increases the amount of capital it
needs to regain its footing. And it is inApnrnpriate to pay for
the ISP's services out of the limited investment capital of the
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EST.
This is the situation in which CDFC and Massachusetts
Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation (CEDAC)
were put during the King administration. State funding for CEDAC
technical assistance to firms and CDC's was curtailed, and CEDAC
was forced to charge CDFC for services to CDC's and affiliated
businesses. These charges were taken out of CDFC's investment
income.[93 To the extent that a firm needs to obtain more
financing in order to afford needed business assistance, charging
that firm for business services merely amounts to an accounting
transfer from the EST's capital base to the ISP's operational
income.
On the other side of the debate. is the opinion that at
least some of the cost of assistance be incurred by the business
itself, even if more financing is renuired as a result. Richard
McLaughlin, executive director of NETAAC, feels that it is
important to charge even firms that are in desparate financial
circumstances, since their inability or unwillingness to pay even
the few thousand dollars needed to perform an initial diagnostic
analysis, provides an indication of the business' overall long
run viability and suggests that further technical or financial
assistance would be futile.E103 For similar reasons, most
investors in both the public and private sector charge an
application fee of some sort in order to cover some of the costs
of considering an application and to weed out frivilous
inquiries. (The EST may want to do likewise, $500 is a common
amount).
To solve this dillemma, assistance to financially needy
74
firms might be provided at a substantially reduced cost, with an
agreement included that any subsidy could be recovered at a later
date if the assistance is successful. CEDAC often executes
agreements within a financial package to recapture some of its
expenses from the recipient if the project succeeds.[113
The business and financial services division of the ISP can
avoid its sole dependency on legislative appropriations, and
increase the resources available to expand its capacity, by
making appropriate charges to its clients. Over the long run, it
is quite possible that the costs of operating the business and
financial services division of the ISP can be largely or wholly
covered by such fees.
5.4 Summary
The EST's concern with non-state sources of capital and
operational funding is a legitimate one. It is only in this way
that the Trust can be assured of stability over time and some
degree of immunity to political influence on assistance
decisions.
Private foundations are a possible source of additional
investment capital through the use of program related
investments. These are compatible in purpose and nature with the
Trust's investments in mature industries.
Fees paid to the business and financial services division of
the ISP for technical assistance received by clients are a likely
source of operational funding for that program. There are a
number of reasons why such charges are appropriate in most cases.
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Footnotes
[1] New Ventures, p.5.
£2) Ibid.
[3) Mc Laughlin interview.
£4) Two technical assistance services contacted in the
preparation of this report, the Ohio Technology Transfer
Organization (OTTO) and the Pennsylvania Technical Assistance
Program (PENNTAP) do not charge users for any services. These
programs, however, are university-based and subsidized, and
specialize in providing a firm with access to other sources of
information (although they also provide more detailed research as
needed.) The federal Small Business Development Centers, also
university-based, provide consulting free of charge and training
sessions at a "nominal" charge.
[5) Interview, Richard Beaudry, Quebec Industrial Research
Center, January 14, 1985.
[6) Interview, Roy Marlow, Director, Pennsylvania Technical
Assistance Program, January 8, 1985.
[73 Mc Laughlin interview.
[83 Weiss, p.25.
[93 "A CEDAC Prograss Report: Its Past Experience and Its
New Directions." unattributed report, January 19, 1983, p.7.
[10) Mc Laughlin interview.
E113 "A CEDAC Progress Report..." p.7.
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